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We conduct a two-phase laboratory experiment, separated by several weeks.  In the first phase, we conduct 
urn games intended to measure ambiguity aversion on a representative population of undergraduate 
students.  In the second phase, we invite the students back with four different solicitation treatments, 
varying in the ambiguity of information regarding the task and the payout of the laboratory experiment.  
We find that those who return do not differ from the overall pool with respect to their ambiguity version.  
However, no solicitation treatment generates a representative sample.  The ambiguous task treatment drives 
away the ambiguity averse disproportionally, and the detailed task treatment draws in the ambiguity averse 
disproportionally. 
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1 Introduction 
Sample selection issues are relevant for any empirical exercise with human subjects. We 
study this problem directly, in the context of laboratory experiments in economics. 
However, the issue is at least as salient for “field experiments” (see Harrison & List 2004 
for an overview). Among other issues, they still need to recruit their subjects, and thus 
there is the possibility for selection bias. Indeed, no sample is likely to be fully 
representative; Gronau (1974) is an early paper that worries about just such an effect on 
wage selectivity in labor markets. We discuss further in the conclusion the relevance for 
both field experiments and for fully naturally occurring observed data. 
 
In order to directly assess such effects, we hypothesize in advance that a particular 
recruitment procedure will affect the composition of the subjects who show up to 
participate. We use standard laboratory protocols for comparability, but the implications 
are similar for either the lab or the field. In particular, we vary the amount of information 
(about the task to be performed and/or the expected payment) revealed at the time of 
recruitment. This is a dimension that varies in any case, but that is not often explicitly 
considered or controlled for. It also has a natural theoretical link to ambiguity-aversion: 
an aversion to uncertainty over states of the world about which the probabilities are 
unknown.
1  We hypothesize that potential subjects who are more ambiguity-averse will 
be less likely to choose to participate if they have less information about their possible 
outcomes. Although we focus on this single aspect, we stress that our concern is broader. 
Selection biases are likely to be present in almost all situations, along a variety of 
dimensions, and by definition they are unusually difficult to test for and to control for. 
 
                                                 
1 Ellsberg (1961) provides the canonical thought experiment, suggesting that individuals, if forced 
to choose between two lotteries with different amounts of information available, will prefer to bet 
on one with a known but unfavorable probability of winning rather than on one with an unknown 
probability. Camerer & Weber (1992) review the early experimental evidence generally 
confirming this intuition. In a more recent study, Ahn et al. (2007) compare various empirical 
measures.   3 
In order to test for this effect here, we begin by inducing a representative sample of 
undergraduates, namely almost all students in several pre-occurring groups, to voluntarily 
participate in the first phase of our experiment in which we measure ambiguity 
preferences (specific procedures are described in Section 2). This is by no means 
representative of the population at large, but if anything it is more homogeneous – 
making it more difficult for us to observe selection effects within that group. In fact, even 
in this case, we do find a significant selection effect when those same students are invited 
to participate in a follow-up experiment via a randomly varied recruitment email. In 
particular, none of the emails that we used successfully led to the same underlying 
distribution of types as existed in the base population (sample frame). 
 
The general issue of potential bias both in subject pools and in subject behaviors has been 
considered by experimental psychologists for many years (Orne 1962; Rosenthal 1973). 
Note that there are two distinct considerations: Who volunteers to participate in an 
experiment to begin with? And does their behavior change relative to other settings? The 
latter effect is sometimes referred to as a demand characteristic, since most studies find 
that subjects appear to conform their behavior to that which is ‘demanded’ by the 
researcher. But of course, without good evidence as to what the baseline population looks 
like, it is difficult or impossible to separate these effects. Experimental economics may 
suffer slightly less from both effects: the first because there is always payment for 
participating; and the second because often we have been interested not in individual 
differences but rather in comparing institutions or testing theories that are supposed to 
apply to everyone equally. Even within economics, this potential problem was discussed 
quite early (e.g., Kagel et al. 1979), but it has received relatively little attention. 
 
As it matures, however, experimental economics has become increasingly interested in 
behavior differences among groups, and here the selection effects are more acute. For 
instance, there are (or have appeared to be) robust gender differences in a variety of 
behaviors. One of these is risk-aversion, and in particular bidding behavior in first-price 
auctions. Women bid higher than men do, which is less risky, and therefore often earn 
less money. Chen et al. (2005) replicate this finding, but then show that, if one controls   4 
for the stage of the women’s menstrual cycle, the differences disappear. There is an 
obvious selection story to back this up: non-menstruating woman have higher estrogen 
levels, leading them to be both more likely to participate in an experiment in the first 
place (indicative of pro-social or affiliative behavior) and to be less ‘aggressive’ once 
they do. 
 
Of course this is not proof of a selection effect, but by definition it is difficult to test that 
portion of the population that tends not to participate in experiments. One indirect 
approach is look at sorting behavior amongst subjects who have already agreed to 
participate in general but who can endogenously choose what task to perform (e.g., what 
game to play, or indeed whether or not to play a game at all). A number of recent papers 
have explored this issue and found significant differences in behavior between those who 
were assigned to a treatment versus those who chose into it.
2 Some of these papers are 
also able to relate individual differences (e.g., overconfidence or risk aversion) to the 
choice of treatment, confirming the idea that underlying preferences affect not only 
people’s behavior, holding the environment fixed, but also what environments people end 
up in. In particular, two papers have looked at endogenous entry into auctions: Reiley 
(2005) manipulates reserve prices in a field setting; Palfrey and Pevnitskaya (2008) 
studies the link between risk tolerance, auction participation, and bidding behavior. All of 
these clearly have implications for the interpretation of any experimental results that wish 
to test for differences involving exactly those underlying preferences. 
 
Three recent papers directly address the issue of determining which subjects actually 
physically show up at an experiment, although of course neither of them can fully 
compare to the (unknowable) general population – and neither do we. The first to do this 
is Harrison et al. (2009), which uses a field experiment setting to look at selection effects 
depending on risk aversion. They find small effects overall, but a noticeable difference 
from the use of a guaranteed show-up fee: not surprisingly, such guarantees are relatively 
more attractive to those who are more risk averse. The second is Jamison et al. (2008), 
                                                 
2 Some examples include Camerer & Lovallo (1999); Lazear et al. (2005); Eriksson et al. (2006); 
Falk and Dohman (2006) and Gaudecker et al. (2008).   5 
which studies the effect of deception in laboratory experiments. They find that deceived 
women and deceived low earners are less likely to show up for a second (nominally 
unrelated) experiment. However, they do not focus on the specifics of the recruitment 
procedure itself. Finally, Malani (2008) looks at self-selection into randomized medical 
trials, finding a link between optimism concerning treatment efficacy (which is correlated 
with the treatment’s effect, due to unobserved individual heterogeneity) and enrollment 
into the trial. 
 
2 Experiment Design and Results 
2.1 Phase 1 Design: Measuring Baseline Ambiguity Aversion  
Our goal in Phase 1 was to determine the ambiguity preferences of a sample of subjects 
into which there would be little or no self-selection specific to our experiment.  Our 
starting sample frame was the population from which economics experiments typically 
solicit: undergraduate students.  We recruited subjects in two methods, both of which are 
particularly common in economics experiments.  First, we asked students in a number of 
introductory economics courses to complete an ambiguity-aversion survey in the final ten 
minutes of a class.  Second, a researcher approached every student he encountered at 
campus libraries and asked each student to complete the same ambiguity-aversion survey.  
There was almost no Phase 1 self-selection (beyond taking undergraduate economics, and 
frequenting the library): all 94 students in the selected economics classes completed the 
survey, and 109 out of 111 of the approached library students completed the survey.
3 
 
The researcher first asked students whether they were willing to complete a brief survey 
in which one in three students earns money based on her responses.  All students agreeing 
to participate signed an informed consent form.  The researcher handed each student brief 
instructions, read the instructions aloud, invited subjects to ask questions, and gave her a 
                                                 
3 We subsequently dropped six subjects from our sample frame.  Four were not on campus when 
we conducted Phase 2, and two learned of the study’s research objectives and revealed this 
through informal communication with one of the researchers.   6 
survey to complete.  Subjects were not informed that they would receive a future 
solicitation to participate in a subsequent experiment. 
 
The survey (Appendix A) contains ten of Ellsberg’s hypothetical urn gambles and 
collects basic demographic data.  In each of five scenarios, there is a hypothetical urn 
containing 100 balls whose distribution of black and red balls is clearly stated (the known 
urn), and a second hypothetical urn also containing 100 red and black balls in total, but 
whose distribution of red and black balls is clearly stated as unknown (the ambiguous 
urn).
4  The five known urns are offered in order: 50 red and 50 black balls; 40 red and 60 
black balls; 30 red and 70 black balls, 20 red and 80 black balls; and 10 red and 90 black 
balls.  For each scenario, we presented the subject with two gambles:  
(1) If we paid you $10 for pulling a red ball on your first try, would you pick from 
the “known” or the “ambiguous” urn?  
(2) If we paid you $10 for pulling a black ball on your first try, would you pick 
from the “known” or the “ambiguous” urn?  
Thus, we presented ten gambles to each subject, and for each gamble asked from which 
urn the subject would draw.  Asking each gamble twice, once for red and once for black, 
eliminated the chance the subject had a preference for a color or mistrusted the 
administrator. 
2.2 Phase 1 Ambiguity Aversion Classification  
Based on Phase 1 survey responses, we place all Phase 1 participants into one of three 
categories: more ambiguity averse (Table 1, 69%), not more ambiguity averse (27%), and 
unable to classify (4%).  To classify subjects, we look at the first “known” urn 
distribution at which a subject chooses the ambiguous urn when betting on whether a red 
ball will be the first ball drawn.
5  We classify as “more ambiguity sensitive” those 
students who first choose the ambiguous urn for the red-ball bet when the known urn 
contains 30 red balls, and who continue to choose the ambiguous urn for the red-ball bet 
                                                 
4 We inform subjects that the distribution of red and black balls in the ambiguous urn is constant 
for all decisions.  We do not refer to urns as ambiguous or known. 
5 Recall that the first known urn contains 50 red and 50 black balls, and each subsequent known 
urn contains 10 fewer red balls and 10 more black balls.   7 
when the known urn contains fewer than 30 red balls.  These subjects chose the known 
urn for both bets when the known urn contains either 50 or 40 red. 
 
Seven subjects switched from the ambiguous urn to the known urn even though the 
known urn in each round became worse.  We presume these individuals were not paying 
attention, or were not understanding the questions well, and thus categorize them as 
"unable to classify" and drop them from the analysis.   
 
We classify all other subjects as “not more ambiguity averse.”  Note that we do not have 
a category "ambiguity neutral" or "ambiguity seeking" because only nine and five 
subjects, respectively, would have been categorized as such.  We thus categorize as "not 
more ambiguity averse" the combination of ambiguity seeking (5 subjects), ambiguity 
neutral (9 subjects) and those that switched at the first round, when the odds were 40% 
for the known urn (122 individuals). 
 
In Table 2 we show, with both OLS and probit specifications, the (lack of) correlation 
between this classification and location of experiment, gender, year in school and major. 
2.3 Phase 2 Solicitation: Observing the Decision to Participate 
The real "experiment" in Phase 2 is simply the decision to respond to our email 
solicitation.  Our goal is to determine whether ambiguity preferences affect the decision 
to participate in laboratory experiments, and then more specifically whether different 
email solicitations affect this selection decision differentially. 
 
We randomly assigned subjects to one of four recruitment treatments (i.e., ambiguity 
classification is orthogonal to treatment assignment).  Treatments differ only in the 
amount of detail provided in the invitation email.  We employ a 2x2 design, with each 
respondent receiving either an ambiguous or detailed description of their task, and either 
an ambiguous or detailed description of their payout.  The "standard" email sent at 
Williams College, and elsewhere (Davis and Holt, 1992), is closest to the ambiguous 
task/ambiguous pay email.     8 
 
Details on each email treatment are as follows (the full text is in Appendix B): 
(1) Ambiguous task/Ambiguous pay: "I am writing to inform you of an opportunity to 
participate in an Economics Department experiment on Tuesday, February 20th from 
7:00 PM until 10:00 PM in Hopkins 108.  You will earn either $10 or $20 by 
participating in this experiment and the session will last about 30 minutes."
6 
(2) Ambiguous task/Detailed pay: Here, the payout section from the ambiguous email is 
replaced by the following: "You will earn either $10 or $20 by participating in this 
experiment. The experiment is designed so that you have a 50% chance of earning $10 
and a 50% chance of earning $20." 
(3) Detailed task/Ambiguous pay: Here each participant is also informed that they will 
play a game in which they will decide how much of their participation fee they want to 
contribute to charity, and then will play games of uncertainty, choosing between known 
and ambiguous urns. 
(4) Detailed task/Detailed pay: The detailed task and detailed pay, as noted from the 
above. 
 
Appendix C provides the detail on the activities in Phase 2.  We do not use any of these 
data in this paper, since the sample size is too small for meaningful distributional analysis 
(to observe whether the differential selection drew in different people, which then would 
lead to different analytical results for the Phase 2 games themselves).  
 
Table 3 presents the key selection results as comparison of means, and Table 4 presents 
them in a probit specification.  First note that Table 3, Row A demonstrates orthogonality 
of ambiguity aversion to assignment to each email treatment, and Appendix Table 1 
demonstrates the same for other known demographic variables. 
 
We have two key hypotheses: 
                                                 
6 While this is more information than is usually provided about expected earnings, unlike the 
detail pay emails, the exact distribution of payouts is unknown.    9 
Hypothesis #1: Those who participate in laboratory experiments do not differ with 
respect to ambiguity aversion from those who do not participate. 
 
Table 3 Column 1 tests this hypothesis with mean comparison, and Table 4 Column 1 
tests this hypothesis with a probit specification.  We cannot reject the null hypothesis.  
Those who participate in Phase 2 are no more or less ambiguity averse than those who do 
not.  Note that this is a pooled analysis, across all four treatment solicitation emails.  
Thus, although we cannot reject the null hypothesis, this null is under the setting of a 
blend of solicitation approaches.  We now turn to examine heterogeneity generated by the 
different solicitations. 
 
Hypothesis #2: The level of ambiguity in each solicitation does not generate differential 
selection on ambiguity personality characteristics with respect to who participates. 
 
In Table 3 columns 2, 3, 5, and 6, we test this hypothesis with respect to ambiguity on 
both task and payout.  Row A in columns 2 and 3 shows the average ambiguity aversion 
for those that received either the ambiguous task or the detailed task is 28.4% in both 
cases (the randomization was stratified on ambiguity, hence the perfect orthogonality).   
 
However, comparing rows B and C shows that the ambiguous task generates differential 
selection towards those less ambiguity averse (p-value 0.079), and that the detailed task 
similarly generates reverse selection towards the more ambiguity averse (p-value  0.014).  
Similar tests for ambiguity on the payment, however, do not yield statistically significant 
differences (nor are they signed as predicted).  We discuss this in the conclusion with 
conjectures as to why the ambiguous payout treatment did not generate differential 
selection, whereas the ambiguous task treatment did. 
 
Table 4 shows similar results, in a probit specification.  Column 2 shows that the 
ambiguous task generates a 6.9 percentage point higher participation rate (not statistically 
significant) and the ambiguous email task generates a 9.4 percentage point higher 
participation rate (significant at 90%).  Column 3 presents the key results on   10 
heterogeneity induced by the solicitation.  Here, we interact the email treatment with 
whether the individual is ambiguity averse or not.  We find the same pattern shown in 
Table 3, that the ambiguous task treatment deters the ambiguity averse from participating 
(significant at 99%), but that the ambiguous payout treatment does not generate 
differential selection patterns.  
 
3. Conclusion 
We examine a new facet of selection into laboratory experiments: ambiguity aversion.  
We find that the method of solicitation generates potentially important heterogeneity with 
respect to ambiguity aversion in the sample frame that participates in experiments.  Thus 
if ambiguity aversion could influence the choices participants make, experimentalists 
should note that the solicitation used could generate higher or lower participation rates, 
depending on how much information is given in the solicitation.  Further research could 
shed insight on two areas.  First, with a larger sample size, further analysis could be done 
to examine whether analytical results change depending on the solicitation method.  
Second, it would be useful to know whether other solicitation methods could generate a 
more representative population.  For instance, paying more money could generate higher 
participation rates, or alternative wording, somewhere in between our ambiguous and 
detailed treatments, may yield the optimal results.  In our setting, it is key to note that we 
found no treatment which drew in a representative population. 
 
Although we find differential selection from the ambiguous task treatment, we do not 
find differential selection from the ambiguous payout treatment.  We have two 
conjectures for why this may be.  First, perhaps the information was simply not 
ambiguous enough.  We stated that they would win between $10 and $20, and although 
this adheres to the canonical urn question fairly accurately, if read quickly it could be 
perceived as more informative than intended.  Second, it is possible that recipients of the 
email did not trust the researcher (whereas in the urn questions, mistrust of the researcher 
should not confound the analysis by design), and thus simply assumed that this really 
means $10, except for very few who would win the $20.   11 
 
These results are important not just for laboratory experiments; similar issues apply to 
field experiments.  We think about two types of field experiments here, "artefactual" or 
"framed" field experiments, using the Harrison and List taxonomy (Harrison and List, 
2004), and "natural" field experiments or for that matter any observational data 
collection.  First, with respect to those cognizant of being "researched" (artefactual or 
framed), the results here are potentially just as applicable in the field as in the laboratory: 
no method of solicitation in our experiment generated a representative sample frame.  
Typical methods in the field could have similar issues, e.g., those who are more social, 
those who are more likely to think the games could lead to NGO handouts, those who are 
more curious, etc., are all more likely to participate, and the method of solicitation could 
exacerbate any of these issues.
7  Regarding "natural" field experiments or any surveying 
process, the issues raised here are also relevant.  The fundamental idea is not new: 
external validity.  This paper sheds insight into how the solicitation method can generate 
more (or, ideally, less) selection which then influences the external validity of the study. 
                                                 
7 Recall Malani (2008), which finds exactly such a problem in the context of medical trials.   12 
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Table 1 
Full Distribution of Ambiguity Urn Decisions from Phase 1 
   Frequency    
Chose ambiguous urn for both red and black at 40/60  5 
  2.5% 
Chose ambiguous urn for both red and black at 50/50  6 
  3.0% 
Chose ambiguous urn for either red or black at 50/50  3 
  1.5% 
Switched to ambiguous urn at 40/60  122 








Switched to ambiguous urn at 30/70  46 
  23.4% 
Switched to ambiguous urn at 20/80  3 
  1.5% 
Switched to ambiguous urn at 10/90  0 
  0.0% 
Never chose ambiguous urn  5 








Unable to classify (i.e., switched back and forth)  7   
  3.6%   
Total  197    
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Table 2 
Determinants Of Ambiguity Classification 
     








Averse in First 
Experiment 
   (1)  (2) 
     
Female  0.038  0.039 
  (0.068)  (0.068) 
First experiment conducted in library  0.086  0.087 
  (0.075)  (0.077) 
First experiment conducted in economics class  Omitted  Omitted 
     
Freshman  0.193  0.174 
  (0.122)  (0.111) 
Sophomore  0.192  0.172 
  (0.125)  (0.111) 
Junior  0.117  0.100 
  (0.133)  (0.116) 
Senior + Graduate  Omitted  Omitted 
     
Economics major  0.093  0.089 
  (0.115)  (0.109) 
Psychology major  -0.073  -0.073 
  (0.208)  (0.238) 
     
R^2  0.022  0.025 
     
Observations  190  190 
Marginal effects are reported for probit specification. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Had  anything  been  significant  statistically,  then  *  would  have 
indicated  significance  at  10  percent;  **  at  5  percent;  and  ***  at  1  percent. 






Table 3: Analysis of Who Participated in Second Experiment 
Mean and Standard Error 


























  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Number of observations in first 
experiment  190  95  95    94  96   
Number participated in second 
experiment  34  22  12    21  13   
Percent participated in second 
experiment  18%  23%  13%  0.058  22%  14%  0.114 
  (0.028)  (0.044)  (0.034)    (0.043)  (0.035)   
               
(A) Proportion more ambiguity 
averse in first experiment  0.284  0.284  0.284  1.000  0.287  0.281  0.927 
  (0.033)  (0.047)  (0.047)    (0.047)  (0.046)   
(B) More ambiguity averse in first 
experiment AND participated in 
second experiment  0.294  0.136  0.583    0.333  0.231   
  (0.079)  (0.075)  (0.149)    (0.105)  (0.122)   
(C) More ambiguity averse in first 
experiment AND did NOT participate 
in second experiment  0.282  0.329  0.241    0.274  0.289   
  (0.036)  (0.055)  (0.047)    (0.053)  (0.050)   
               







Determinants Of Whether A Subject Participated in Second Exepriment 
Probit 
Binary Dependent Variable:  Participated in Second Experiment 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
       
More ambiguity averse in first experiment  0.012  0.011  0.208 
  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.140) 
Email with ambiguous task    0.069  0.164*** 
    (0.054)  (0.063) 
Email with ambiguous payout    0.094*  0.080 
    (0.054)  (0.062) 
Email with ambiguous task AND recipient "more ambiguity averse" in first 
experiment      -0.184*** 
      (0.039) 
Email with ambiguous payout AND recipient "more ambiguity averse" in first 
experiment      0.012 
      (0.121) 
Controls for year gender, year in school, major, and location of first 
experiment  yes  yes  yes 
       
Pseduo r-squared  0.098  0.125  0.174 
       
Number of Observations  190  190  190 
Marginal effects are reported for coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 
percent. ** at 5 percent. *** at 1 percent. 
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Appendix A: Phase 1 Experiment Instructions 
In this experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices.  In each scenario, there 
are two urns. Both will always contain 100 balls, each ball being either red or black. In 
each scenario, you will know the exact number of black and red balls in one urn, but you 
will not know the number of each color in the second urn, only that there are 100 balls in 
the second urn and every ball is either red or black. The balls are well mixed so that each 
individual ball is as likely to be drawn as any other. 
After all questionnaires have been completed, the experimenter will select at random one-
third of all questionnaires.  For each questionnaire selected, the experimenter will 
randomly select one of the five scenarios, with each scenario as likely to be drawn as any 
other.  The experimenter will then randomly select one of the two questions within the 
selected scenario, with each question as likely to be selected as the other.  Finally, if your 
questionnaire is selected, a ball will be drawn on your behalf, with each ball as likely to 
be drawn as any other.   
Finally, please note that there are no tricks in this experiment.  While in each scenario 
there is an urn for which you do not know the number of black and red balls, the number 
of unknown balls of each type already has been selected at random and is on file with the 
Williams College Department of Economics.  Likewise, the pull of a ball from a chosen 
urn will truly be done at random via a process overseen by the Department of Economics. 
[We present 5 of the following questions, with M=1,2,3,4,5.] 
Decision # {M} 
Urn A: 100 balls: {50-(M-1)*10)} red, {50+(M-1)*10)} black 
Urn C: 100 balls: ? red, ? black 
If I were to give you $10 if you pulled a red ball on your first try, from which 
urn would you choose to draw? 
￿ Urn A                    ￿ Urn C 
 
If I were to give you $10 if you pulled a black ball on your first try, from which 
urn would you choose to draw? 
￿ Urn A                    ￿ Urn C  
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Appendix B: Text of Invitation Emails 
Ambiguous Email 
I am writing to inform you of an opportunity to participate in an Economics Department 
experiment on Tuesday, February 20th from 7:00 PM until 10:00 PM in Hopkins 108.  
You will earn either $10 or $20 by participating in this experiment and the session will 
last about 30 minutes. 
 
Detailed Task, Ambiguous Payment Email 
I am writing to inform you of an opportunity to participate in an Economics Department 
experiment on Tuesday, February 20th from 7:00 PM until 10:00pm in Hopkins 108. You 
will earn either $10 or $20 by participating in this experiment, and the session will last 
about 30 minutes. The experiment will consist of two sections.  
In the first section, you will have the opportunity, in private, to donate part of your show 
up fee to a charity.  The amount you give to the charity will be matched by the 
experimenter.  
In the second section, you will be asked to make a series of decisions. For each decision, 
you will be asked to choose one of two options where the outcome of each option is 
uncertain.  In some decisions, you will know the probability of each outcome within each 
option.  In other decisions, you will not know the probability of each outcome for one of 
the options. After you have made your decisions, we will randomly select some of your 
decisions and you will be paid according to your choices. 
 
Ambiguous Task, Detailed Payment Email 
I am writing to inform you of an opportunity to participate in an Economics Department 
experiment on Tuesday, February 20th from 7:00 PM until 10:00 PM in Hopkins 108.  
You will earn either $10 or $20 by participating in this experiment. The experiment is 
designed so that you have a 50% chance of earning $10 and a 50% chance of earning 
$20.   The session will last about 30 minutes. 
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Detailed Task, Detailed Payment Email 
I am writing to inform you of an opportunity to participate in an Economics Department 
experiment on Tuesday, February 20th from 7:00 PM until 10:00pm in Hopkins 108. You 
will earn either $10 or $20 by participating in this experiment. The experiment is 
designed so that you have a 50% chance of earning $10 and a 50% chance of earning 
$20. The session will last about 30 minutes. The experiment will consist of two sections.  
In the first section, you will have the opportunity, in private, to donate part of your show 
up fee to a charity.  The amount you give to the charity will be matched by the 
experimenter.  
In the second section, you will be asked to make a series of decisions. For each decision, 
you will be asked to choose one of two options where the outcome of each option is 
uncertain.  In some decisions, you will know the probability of each outcome within each 
option.  In other decisions, you will not know the probability of each outcome for one of 
the options. After you have made your decisions, we will randomly select some of your 
decisions and you will be paid according to your choices. 
 
All Four Emails: 
To sign up to participate in this experiment, please click on the link below.  
  21 
Appendix C: Phase 2 Experiment Instructions 
[Italicized text in brackets details how subject instructions vary.  Text in braces identifies 
the alternative text.] 
 Welcome to this experiment on decision-making and thank you for being here. You will 
be compensated for your participation in the experiment, though the exact amount you 
will receive will depend on the choices you make, and on random chance. Even though 
you will make twenty decisions, only one of these will end up being used to determine 
your payment.  Please pay careful attention to these instructions, as a significant amount 
of money is at stake. 
Information about the choices that you make during the experiment will be kept strictly 
confidential. In order to maintain privacy and confidentiality, please do not speak to 
anyone during the experiment and please do not discuss your choices with anyone even 
after the conclusion of the experiment. 
This experiment has four parts. First, you will be asked to make a series of decisions 
regarding charitable donations. In the second and third sections, you will be asked to 
make a series of choices between options, where the outcome of each option is not known 
with certainty. Finally, you will be asked a series of questions which you will either agree 
or disagree with along a scale. More detailed instructions will follow in each section. 
 
Part I: 
Today you received four envelopes: a “Start” envelope, a “Me” envelope, a “1” envelope, 
and a “2” envelope. In the start envelope you will find ten $1 bills and ten dollar-size 
pieces of blank paper. You will now have the opportunity to share part or all of the $10 
with one or both of two charities.  Any money that you donate to either charity will be 
matched, meaning every dollar you donate will result in the charity receiving two dollars. 
You may donate as much or as little of the $10 to each of these charities as you wish by 
placing dollar bills in the corresponding envelopes.  At the end of the experiment, you 
will keep the “Me” envelope and any dollar bills you place in that envelope. 
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[A subject receives one of four versions.  In half, Oxfam is the known charity while 
Habitat for Humanity is ambiguously described, whereas in the other half, Habitat for 
Humanity is the known charity while Oxfam is ambiguously described.  We controlled for 
order effects. The ambiguous description is in braces.] 
1.  Envelope 1: Habitat for Humanity, a nonprofit organization that builds home for 
those in need which has been instrumental in Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in the 
United States. {A nonprofit organization that works to help victims of natural disasters in 
the United States.} 
2.  Envelope 2: Oxfam, a nonprofit organization that works to minimize poverty 
through relief and development work in Africa, committed to creating lasting solutions to 
global poverty, hunger and social injustice. {A nonprofit organization that works to 
alleviate poverty in Africa} 
 
Part II: 
You will be making 10 choices between two lotteries, such as those represented as 
“Option A” and “Option B” below. The money prizes are determined by the computer 
equivalent of rolling a ten-sided die. Each outcome, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, is equally 
likely.  A computer generated “roll” for that decision will be made and you will be paid 
based on your decision. 
Finally, please note that there are no tricks in this experiment.  The roll will truly 
be done at random via a process overseen by the Department of Economics. 
[We present 10 of the following questions, with N=1,2,…,9,10.] 
Decision {N} 
If you choose Option A in the row shown below, you will have a {N} in 10 
chance of earning $5.50 and a {10-N} in 10 chance of earning $4.40. Similarly, 
Option B offers a {N} in 10 chance of earning $10.60 and a {10-N} in 10 
chance of earning $0.28. 
  Option A  Option B 
  $5.50 if the die is 1  $10.60 if the die is 1 
  $4.40 if the die is 2-10  $0.28 if the die is 2-10                                                        
  ￿ Option A   ￿ Option B  
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Part III: 
In this section you will be asked to make a series of choices.  In each scenario, there are 
two urns. Both will always contain 100 balls, each ball being either red or black. In each 
scenario, you will know the exact number of black and red balls in one urn, but you will 
not know the number of each color in the second urn, only that there are 100 balls in the 
second urn and every ball is either red or black. The balls are well mixed so that each 
individual ball is as likely to be drawn as any other. 
For each questionnaire selected, the experimenter will randomly select one of the five 
scenarios, with each scenario as likely to be drawn as any other.  The experimenter will 
then randomly select one of the two questions within the selected scenario, with each 
question as likely to be selected as the other.  Finally, if your questionnaire is selected, a 
ball will be drawn on your behalf, with each ball as likely to be drawn as any other.   
Finally, please note that there are no tricks in this experiment.  While in each scenario 
there is an urn for which you do not know the number of black and red balls, the number 
of unknown balls of each type already has been selected at random and is on file with the 
Williams College Department of Economics.  Likewise, the pull of a ball from a chosen 
urn will truly be done at random via a process overseen by the Department of Economics.  
[We present 5 of the following questions, with M=1,2,3,4,5.] 
 
Decision # {M} 
Urn A: 100 balls: {50-(M-1)*10)} red, {50+(M-1)*10)} black 
Urn C: 100 balls: ? red, ? black 
If I were to give you $10 if you pulled a red ball on your first try, from which 
urn would you choose to draw? 
￿ Urn A                    ￿ Urn C 
 
If I were to give you $10 if you pulled a black ball on your first try, from which 
urn would you choose to draw? 
￿ Urn A                    ￿ Urn C 
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Part IV: 
Please answer the below questions according to your own feelings, rather than how you 
think "most people" would answer. Please be as honest and accurate as you can 
throughout, there is no right or wrong answer.  Also, please try not to let your response to 
one statement influence your responses to other statements.  Think about each statement 
on its own.  Please circle your response in the table. 
 A = I agree a lot  
 B = I agree a little  
 C = I neither agree nor disagree  
 D = I disagree a little  
 E = I disagree a lot  
In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.  A  B  C  D  E 
It’s easy for me to relax.   A  B  C  D  E 
If something can go wrong, it will.   A  B  C  D  E 
I’m always optimistic about the future.   A  B  C  D  E 
I enjoy my friends a lot.   A  B  C  D  E 
It’s important for me to keep busy.   A  B  C  D  E 
I hardly ever expect things to go my way.   A  B  C  D  E 
I don’t get upset too easily.   A  B  C  D  E 
I rarely count on good things happening to me.   A  B  C  D  E 
Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.   A  B  C  D  E 